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Standalone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports vary considerably in the content of 
information released due to their voluntary nature. In this study, we develop a disclosure score based 
on the tone, readability, length, and the numerical and horizon content of CSR report narratives, and 
examine the relationship between the CSR disclosure scores and analyst forecasts. We find that CSR 
reporters with high disclosure scores are associated with more accurate forecasts, whereas low score 
CSR reporters are not associated with more accurate forecasts than firms who do not issue CSR reports. 
The findings are robust to controlling for firm characteristics including CSR activity ratings and 
financial narratives. The findings are driven by experienced CSR reporters rather than first-time CSR 
reporters. Together, our findings suggest that the content of CSR reports helps to improve analyst 
forecast accuracy, and this relationship is more pronounced for CSR reports with more substantial 
content.  
 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility reporting, textual disclosures, analyst forecasts. 
 
*The corresponding author can be reached by email at atsang@schulich.yorku.ca. The previous title of this paper was “Measuring 
Corporate Social Responsibility Report Quality Using Narratives.” We acknowledge the helpful comments of seminar participants 
at the 2014 AAA annual conference, 2014 Journal of Business Ethics conference, National Taiwan University, Fudan University, 
University of Exeter, University of Bristol, and Imperial College. 




Investors have increasingly considered corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities 
when making investment decisions (Elliott et al. 2014). In response, many firms have started to 
issue standalone CSR reports.1 While providing extensive information about CSR activities to 
investors (Simnett et al. 2009; Cohen and Simnett 2014; Casey and Grenier 2015), these reports 
bring significant capital market benefits to the firms (Lys et al. 2015). For instance, issuance of 
standalone CSR reports reduces cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and improves analyst 
forecast accuracy (Dhaliwal et al. 2012).  
The information contained in CSR reports varies in amount and format due to the lack of 
an enforced CSR reporting framework (Perrini 2005; Holder-Webb et al. 2009; Ramanna 2013; 
Campopiano and De Massis 2015; Sethi et al. 2015).2 In addition, the opportunistic incentives of 
managers to positively skew corporate information coupled with the voluntary nature of CSR 
reporting can hamper the credibility of CSR reports (Ramanna 2013; Mishra and Modi 2013). 
Consequently, firms face challenges in enhancing the credibility and thus capital market impact of 
their CSR reports (Hobson and Kachelmeier 2005; Holder-Webb et al. 2009; Simnett et al. 2009; 
Cohen and Simnett 2014; Chen et al. 2016). 
In order to enhance the credibility and capital market impact of their CSR reports, firms 
can commit to high-quality financial reporting (Chen et al. 2016), perform effective CSR activities 
(Dawkins and Fraas 2001; Cho et al. 2006; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Hummel and Schlick 2015), and 
seek assurance from independent CSR assurance providers (Perego and Kolk 2012; Casey and 
                                                          
1 These reports take different names such as (corporate) sustainability reports (Ioannou and Serafeim 2012; Simnett 
et al. 2009), accountability reports (Ramanna 2013), and responsibility reports (Corporate Register). 
2 For example, a study by Governance & Accountability Institute (the U.S. data partner of Global Reporting Initiative) 




Grenier 2015; Cheng et al. 2015). In addition, can firms use the narratives in CSR reports to 
enhance credibility? It is not clear whether the narratives affect the credibility and capital market 
impact of CSR reports in addition to the already-established capital market benefits of the issuance 
of CSR reports (Dhaliwal et al. 2011, 2012). To provide insights into this, we construct a disclosure 
score based on CSR report narratives and examine how this score is associated with analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. 
Information about firms’ CSR activities will be useful to analysts only if CSR activities 
affect firms’ financial performance. Through a meta-analysis of 127 studies, Margolis and Walsh 
(2003) document a positive link between CSR activities and firms’ financial performance. Recent 
studies have also documented how CSR activities are linked to financial performance. For 
example, firms with more CSR activities receive more favorable financing from banks (Goss and 
Roberts 2011); charitable contributions enhance sales growth (Lev et al. 2010); acquirers with 
more CSR activities perform better in their M&A deals (Deng et al. 2013); and CSR activities 
improve financial performance especially for innovative firms (Mishra 2015). In addition, CSR 
activities and disclosures motivate companies to improve their relationship with their stakeholders 
(Ioannou and Serafeim 2014; Christensen 2016).   
The above evidence, which establishes the link between CSR activities and financial 
performance, suggests that analysts use information on CSR activities—especially credible CSR 
information—while forecasting firms’ performance. Consistent with this suggestion, CSR Europe, 
Deloitte, and EuroNext’s (2003) survey finds that half of the 400 mainstream mutual fund 
managers and analysts use CSR-related information in their investment and forecasting models. 
Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) document that analysts provide more accurate forecasts for issuers 
of CSR reports. We extend this finding by examining whether it is the mere act of issuing CSR 
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reports or narratives in the CSR reports that help analysts improve their forecast. 
Beyer et al. (2010, p. 312) suggest that “analyzing disclosures using natural language 
processing techniques seems most promising in creating meaningful disclosure quality measures 
for large samples.” Prior studies that use computer linguistic techniques find that various aspects 
of financial statement narratives such as pessimism, readability, length, numerical content, and 
horizon content are informative to users and/or associated with future performance (Li 2010a, 
2010b; Muslu et al. 2015). Capitalizing on these findings, we rank CSR reports higher if they 
include fewer optimistic and more pessimistic keywords; if they are easily readable; if they are 
longer; and if they have more numerical and horizon content. We then aggregate these aspects into 
a composite disclosure rank score. We hypothesize that reports with higher disclosure scores will 
be more useful to investors. Accordingly, we expect that analyst forecast accuracy increases with 
CSR disclosure scores. If, on the other hand, narratives in CSR disclosures are not credible or if 
analysts do not pay attention to the narratives but only to firms’ decision to issue CSR reports, then 
analyst forecast accuracy will not increase with CSR disclosure scores after controlling for firms’ 
decision to issue the CSR reports.  
Our tests involve dividing firms with CSR reports into low, middle, and high disclosure 
score groups and treating firms without CSR reports as the benchmark. We then examine current 
year, one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead average analyst earnings forecast accuracy across the 
groups, after controlling for published CSR performance scores and firm characteristics which 
may affect analyst forecasts as identified by Dhaliwal et al. (2012). We document the following 
results. First, the average analyst forecast accuracy is not statistically different between firms with 
low CSR disclosure scores and firms without CSR reports. Second, the average analyst forecast 
accuracy is significantly higher for firms with middle and high CSR disclosure scores than firms 
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without CSR reports. Third, the average forecast accuracy is significantly higher for firms with 
high CSR disclosure scores than firms with low CSR disclosure scores. Overall, CSR reports with 
higher scores help analysts improve their forecasts.  
We also distinguish between the first and subsequent CSR reports of a firm, because 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that initiation of CSR reports is more likely to be linked to the capital 
market consequences. We find that the positive association between CSR disclosure score and 
analyst forecast accuracy is more pronounced for subsequent CSR reports than initial CSR reports. 
This finding suggests that firms build credibility over time through committing to a CSR reporting 
practices, and that investors and analysts do not simply react to CSR reports without considering 
firms’ long-term CSR reporting practices. 
As a robustness check, we re-examine our findings after controlling for two publicly-
available CSR disclosure quality measures: Presence of Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
framework in CSR reports, and CSR reporting transparency ratings issued by Kinder, Lydenberg, 
and Domini Research and Analytics (KLD).3, 4 Our narrative-based CSR disclosure score 
continues to have a significant and positive association with analyst forecast accuracy after 
controlling for these alternative measures. This is consistent with our score capturing CSR 
reporting properties that are beyond those observed by the CSR rating agencies.  
Prior research argues that companies have their CSR reports audited to make them more 
credible to users (Simnett et al. 2009). Building upon this argument, we examine whether CSR 
reports that are audited complement or substitute for better disclosures. We find that the analyst 
                                                          
3 GRI has pioneered a comprehensive CSR reporting framework that is used worldwide. GRI seeks to improve 
comparability, credibility and relevance of CSR information disclosed by different firms and thus to improve users’ 
understanding of sustainability-related risks and opportunities.  
4 KLD provides social screenings and performance rating of firms via its reports and socially screened mutual funds. 
KLD’s CSR performance database is used widely in the literature (e.g., Hillman and Keim 2001; Chatterji et al. 2009; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012). 
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forecast accuracy is positively associated with the interaction of audited CSR reports and CSR 
disclosure score. This suggests that external assurance of CSR reports complement the capital 
market impact of CSR disclosure score. 
Our study extends research on reporting CSR activities through standalone reports (Simnett 
et al. 2009; Elliott et al. 2014; Dhaliwal et al. 2011, 2012; Casey and Grenier 2015; Campopiano 
and De Massis 2015; Sethi et al. 2015). We provide evidence that not only the decision to issue 
standalone CSR reports, but also the narrative of CSR reports (e.g., what is said and how it is said) 
affects market participants.   
Second, the literature on corporate sustainability has long been interested in factors that 
affect the credibility and consequences of voluntary CSR disclosures (Ingram and Frazier 1980; 
Wiseman 1982). A potential weakness in the previous CSR reporting studies is the reliance on a 
dichotomous variable for whether or not a firm issues a CSR report. Consequently, these studies 
offer little insights about CSR reporting quality. To our knowledge, our study is the first that uses 
a disclosure score based on the content of standalone CSR reports.5 In addition, our CSR reporting 
quality measure offers guidelines for companies toward improving the quality and ultimately the 
impact of their reports. This finding is important, given that the external assurance of CSR 
reporting, which is another mechanism to improve the credibility of CSR disclosures, remains 
relatively uncommon in the many parts of the world including the U.S. (Holder-Webb et al. 2009; 
Simnett et al. 2009; Perego and Kolk 2012).  
                                                          
5 Cho et al. (2010) and Plumlee et al. (2014) are notable exceptions. Cho et al. (2010) develop an index of optimism 
bias and uncertainty in 10-K narratives pertaining to environmental disclosure. Consistent with the GRI disclosure 
framework, Plumlee et al. (2014) develop a disclosure score of voluntary environmental disclosures for a sample of 
U.S. firms in five industries. Specifically, Plumlee et al. (2014) show that voluntary environmental disclosure score is 
associated with firm value. They further partition the disclosure score by disclosure type (hard/objective and 
soft/subjective) and disclosure nature (whether the hard/soft disclosure is related to positive/neutral/negative 
environmental issues). In contrast to these studies, our disclosure score includes all CSR activities reported on the 





2. Hypothesis Development 
The primary objective of this study is to examine how CSR report narratives affect analyst 
forecasts. For this purpose, we use insights from prior studies on financial narratives.  
2.1 Narratives in Financial Reports 
One stream of research on financial narratives studies their information content. Kothari et 
al. (2009a) find that favorable (unfavorable) disclosures from firms, analysts, and press are 
associated with lower (higher) firm risk. Li (2010a) finds that tone of forward-looking statements 
in Management and Discussion Analysis (MD&A) section of 10-K and 10-Q reports reflect future 
performance. Feldman et al. (2010), Loughran and McDonald (2011), and Davis et al. (2012) show 
that investors react to the tone in 10-K reports, 10-Q reports, and earnings announcements, 
respectively. Collectively, optimistic and pessimistic tones in financial narratives reflect future 
performance. However, pessimistic tone more strongly reflects future performance and bring 
stronger investor reaction, suggesting that investors recognize firms’ opportunistic incentives. 
Managers have opportunistic incentives to affect stock prices, avoid regulatory and investor 
scrutiny, and negotiate debt and compensation contracts (Kothari et al. 2009b). 
Another stream of research studies obfuscation incentives of managers. Managers can 
deflect attention from controversial or unacceptable information to desirable information (Elsbach 
and Sutton 1992). Firms that publish less readable financial reports have poor performance and 
less persistent profits (Li 2008). Less readable reports are also associated with higher stock return 
volatility, higher analyst forecast dispersion and lower forecast accuracy (Lehavy et al. 2011; 
Loughran and McDonald 2014). Collectively, less readable financial reports are less informative.  
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One other stream of research studies the content of narratives (Bryan 1997). Hussainey et 
al. (2003), Schleicher et al. (2007), and Hussainey and Walker (2009) show that forward-looking 
MD&A disclosures in the U.K. are informative. Muslu et al. (2015) find that short-horizon MD&A 
disclosures help investors incorporate information on future performance into stock prices. 
Collectively, quantitative and future-oriented financial narratives are more informative. 
2.2 Narratives in Financial Reports versus CSR Reports 
The financial reporting framework, which has developed over centuries, has three 
important characteristics (Ijiri 1965; Ramanna 2013). First, it discloses verifiable information, 
mitigating information asymmetry between managers and investors. Verifiability implies that 
information is auditable so that managers are held accountable for misstatements. Verifiability is 
also associated with conservatism, which implies that decreases in net assets have lower 
verification standards than increases in net assets, safeguarding investors from overly optimistic 
disclosures (Ball et al. 2000). Second, the financial statement reporting framework includes 
performance and position reports, which are collectively useful to investors (Ramanna 2013). 
Third, it matches managers’ actions to outcomes of the actions because the financial reporting 
framework is enforced through a combination of litigation, external audit, and regulatory 
oversight.  
CSR reporting lacks these characteristics despite significant attempts to standardize and 
enforce CSR reporting and auditing framework (Ramanna 2013; Sethi et al. 2015). Firms have 
significant discretion in whether and how much CSR information to disclose as well as whether to 
have CSR reports audited.6  Even when the reports are audited, the scope of the audit pertains 
                                                          
6 GRI is the most successful attempt to standardize CSR reporting. The latest GRI guidelines (GRI4) divide CSR 
reporting into economic, environment, and social categories, with social category further divided into sub-categories 
of labor practices and decent work, human rights, society, and product responsibility. Furthermore, auditing standards 
for CSR reporting have recently been developed. For example, the U.K. Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability 
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typically to the process and not to the information content. Mishra and Modi (2013) show that 
firms emphasize the positive aspects and ignore the negative aspects of CSR performance. The 
opportunistic incentives of managers to positively skew CSR reporting coupled with the lack of 
an enforced CSR reporting framework have the potential to widen the information asymmetry 
between managers and investors about firms’ CSR activities and their financial consequences, 
rendering CSR reports useless to investors.  
The potentially high information asymmetry about CSR activities highlights the 
importance of examining disclosure quality and information content of CSR reports.7 GRI states: 
“A primary goal of reporting is to contribute to an ongoing stakeholder dialogue. Reports alone 
provide little value if they fail to inform stakeholders or support a dialogue that influences the 
decisions and behavior of both the reporting organization and its stakeholders” (GRI 2002, p. 9). 
Accordingly, our objective is to examine whether the narratives of CSR reports are informative to 
stakeholders and specifically stock investors. We measure the informativeness of CSR reports by 
improved forecast accuracy of analysts.  
2.3 Empirical Expectations 
Through CSR activities, companies contribute to economic development and improve the 
quality of life of the workforce, their families, the local community, and the society at large. In 
their meta-analyses, Orlitzky et al. (2003) and Margolis and Walsh (2003) document a positive 
association between CSR performance and financial performance. CSR activities enhance 
                                                          
developed AA1000 Assurance Standard, and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board developed 
the International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000. Given the lack of an enforced standard CSR reporting, 
the auditing standards attempt to verify processes. 
7 While a universal notion of disclosure quality does not exist, the conceptual frameworks of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) point to various desirable 
aspects of disclosure such as understandability, relevance, reliability, and comparability (Botosan 2004). There are 
some notable attempts to measure disclosure score. For instance, Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) use concepts of width 
(i.e., coverage and dispersion of different topics that qualify a firm’s business model) and depth (i.e., insights related 
to performance) of disclosure besides quantity of disclosure. 
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financial performance by improving brand image (Brown and Dacin 1997; Lev et al. 2010); 
attracting and motivating employees (Waddock and Graves 1997; Roberts and Dowling 2002; 
Edmans 2011); improving relations with regulators (Brown et al. 2006); improving relations with 
creditors (Goss and Roberts 2011; Cheng et al. 2013); and mitigating regulatory and operational 
risk (Starks 2009). The widely-documented link between CSR performance and performance 
suggests that CSR disclosures provide useful information to investors (Werther and Chandler 
2006). Accordingly, recent research documents that environmental disclosures are associated with 
significant capital market benefits such as reduced cost of equity capital (Plumlee et al. 2014) and 
higher share prices (Matsumura et al. 2014).  
While Plumlee et al. (2014) and Matsumura et al. (2014) examine disclosures pertaining to 
a single CSR activity, i.e., environmental activities, Dhaliwal et al. (2011, 2012) examine the 
incidence of standalone CSR reports that report a wide range of CSR activities. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011) find that firms initiating CSR reports achieve a lower cost of equity capital and lower 
analyst forecast errors when the disclosures could be supported by superior CSR activities. 
Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find that the positive association between CSR reports and analyst 
forecast accuracy is stronger in countries with stronger stakeholder-orientation, presumably 
because the presence of stronger complementary institutions lends credibility to CSR reporting. 
These findings suggest that the capital market benefits associated with standalone CSR reports are 
unlikely to be driven by the CSR report issuance decision alone.  
From an information perspective, prior research of disclosures such as earnings 
announcements and Management, Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of annual reports 
show that the optimistic and pessimistic tones and readability of disclosures are associated with 
future financial performance and short-term investor reaction (see discussion in Section 2.1 
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above). The MD&A and earnings announcements are similar to the CSR standalone disclosures in 
that there are few standards for the narratives in these reports. For example, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has continually found MD&A’s to be deficient (SEC 1989, 2003; 
Garmong 2007). Even though the SEC’s review found MD&A’s to be deficient, research finds 
that the tone, readability and content of such disclosures are indicative of disclosure quality (see 
Muslu et al. 2015). Similarly, we expect that firms with better CSR report disclosures (as measured 
in tone, readability, and content) reduce the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. Consequently, using high-quality CSR disclosures, analysts must be able to better 
predict performance consequences of CSR activities, improving overall accuracy of their earnings 
forecasts.8 This prediction is stated in the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis: Firms with better CSR report disclosures are associated with  
more accurate analyst forecasts. 
 
There are a couple of noteworthy points regarding the hypothesis. First, the voluntary 
nature of CSR disclosures for standalone CSR reports provides the null hypothesis benchmark (see 
Ramanna 2013). If firms opportunistically provide information in CSR reports that are not credible 
and as such not informative, then these disclosures are unlikely to have any significant effect on 
analyst forecast accuracy (see Mishra and Modi 2013). In addition, if analysts only look for the 
incidence of the CSR report and do not read the content of the report, then the reports are not likely 
to be informative. 
Second, we focus on analysts forecast accuracy as the proxy for capital market benefits, 
and not reduced forecast dispersion, because forecast dispersion likely captures a myriad of 
                                                          
8 Through our review of analysts’ research reports, we do not find explicit references to disclosure quality of firms’ 
CSR reports. However, we find frequent references to firms’ CSR activities, especially environmental activities. 
Analysts likely gather information about firms’ CSR activities from firms’ disclosures, including CSR reports. 
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constructs – disagreements among investors, noise in analysts’ private signals, and noise in the 
analysts’ interpretation of public signals to name a few (Barron et al. 1998; Diether et al. 2002; 
Dische 2002; Barron et al. 2009). Note that our objective is to examine the impact of narratives in 
CSR reports and develop a disclosure score that can be replicated in large sample studies. 
Therefore we focus on the most direct capital market consequence, i.e., forecast accuracy, which 
proxies for the reduction of information asymmetry between investors and firms.9 
  
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Sample  
The sample consists of all firms with KLD ratings from 2000 to 2011. We follow Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011, 2012) and compile standalone CSR reports of the KLD-rated firms in the Corporate 
Register database, which is the leading repository of CSR reports worldwide. There are 24,020 
annual observations from 4,227 firms with KLD ratings; of these 2,462 annual observations from 
401 firms have standalone CSR reports.  
Table 1, Panel A provides the annual distribution of the sample. The number of KLD-rated 
firms increased from 455 in 2000 to 2,529 in 2011, attesting to stakeholders’ and firms’ growing 
emphasis on CSR activities in the U.S. Similarly, the number of KLD-rated firms with standalone 
CSR reports increased from 34 in 2000 to 393 in 2011. The percentage of KLD-rated firms that 
issue CSR reports is 7% in 2000 and increases to 16% in 2011, suggesting growing importance of 
issuing CSR reports. Table 1, Panel B shows that firms that operate in chemicals and utilities 
                                                          
9 When we examine the association between narratives in CSR reports and analysts’ forecast dispersion, we find 
results that are qualitatively similar to that of forecast accuracy. Specifically, analysts’ forecast dispersion is lower 
among firms with high CSR disclosure scores. 
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industries are more likely to issue CSR reports. As such, we control for year and industry fixed 
effects in empirical analyses. 
3.2 CSR Report Disclosure Score  
Using insights from the textual analysis of financial reports (as discussed in Section 2.1), 
we measure the disclosure score of narratives in the CSR reports using the following aspects: 
1. Tone: Presentation of content changes users’ beliefs independent of content (Levin et al. 1998; 
Katz 2001; Morris et al. 2007). Optimistic (pessimistic) sentences are likely to pertain to positive 
(negative) aspects of CSR. Given managers’ opportunistic incentives to disclose positive aspects 
and ignore the negative aspects of CSR (Mishra and Modi 2013), firms that disclose the negative 
aspects are likely to be more transparent. In other words, CSR reports with more of negative 
aspects, i.e., pessimistic tone, will have higher disclosure quality; and CSR reports with more of 
positive aspects, i.e., optimistic tone, will have lower disclosure quality. This is consistent with 
empirical evidence that examine the narrative disclosures of earnings announcements (Davis and 
Tama-Sweet 2012). We measure the tone of CSR reports by using “financial negative” and 
“financial positive” word lists developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011).10 Pessimistic tone 
RATIO_PES is calculated as the ratio of the number of financial negative words over total number 
of words in the report. Optimistic tone RATIO_OPT is calculated as the ratio of the number of 
financial positive words over total number of words in the report.  
2. Readability: Firms can make disclosures less readable in order to hide poor performance (Li 
2008). Again similar to the arguments with the tone of the CSR narratives, firms with more 
readable CSR reports are more transparent and are less likely to hide and obfuscate CSR activities. 
                                                          
10 These lists have been increasingly used in the accounting and finance studies. Li (2010a) suggests that alternative 
lists, such as Diction, General Inquirer, and the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, do not work well for corporate 
filings. Given that we examine a capital market consequence of CSR reports, we believe the financial tone of the 
narratives is more appropriate than using a more general list.  
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We use the Smog (Simple Measure of Gobbledygook) index developed by Harry McLaughlin, 
which indicates the number of years of formal education a reader of average intelligence needs to 
understand the report. Specifically, readability is computed as SMOG=1.043*[(number of 
polysyllables)*(30/(number of sentences))]1/2+3.129.11  
3. Length: CSR report length may indicate more information about CSR activity. Longer reports 
have more information than shorter reports (Li 2008). Accordingly, we use the number of words 
in the CSR report as the measure of length. However, the length of the report could also proxy for 
the complexity of CSR activities. Firms with more complex CSR activities are likely to have longer 
reports. Complexity of CSR activities is likely to reduce the informativeness of the CSR report 
(see Li 2008 for a similar argument and evidence for financial reports). In addition, firms that want 
to obfuscate its report could make the report lengthier (Loughran and McDonald 2014). To use 
report length as an aspect of disclosure quality, we filter out its complexity/obfuscation component. 
Specifically, we define RESWORDS as the residual from the regression of the CSR report length 
(log of the number of words in the report) on SMOG.  
4. Numerical content: Numerical and quantitative information is understood by users, i.e., 
investors/analysts, with stronger precision than narrative information (Lundholm et al. 2014). King 
et al. (1990) suggest that quantitative versus qualitative disclosures show the precision of 
managers’ beliefs about the future (also see Hughes and Pae 2004). Huang et al. (2013) find that 
investors react more when earnings press releases include numbers in their title. As such, we 
consider more quantitative/numerical information as being indicative of better CSR report 
disclosure quality. To measure numerical content, we define RATIO_NUM as the ratio of the 
                                                          
11 We use other readability measures (Li 2008), i.e., Fog, Flesch-Kincaid, and Flesch reading ease indices, and find 
similar results to those reported.  
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number of Arabic numerals and quantitative words (e.g., first, second, half) over total number of 
words in the report. 
5. Horizon content: CSR information is likely to be more informative when it includes information 
about future trends and/or targets. Muslu et al. (2015) find that horizon content in forward-looking 
statements help investors predict future performance. Following Muslu et al. (2015), we measure 
horizon content of CSR disclosure by defining RATIO_ HOR as the ratio of the number of future 
years plus horizon references (e.g., 2 years, two years, short term, and upcoming year) over total 
number of words in the report. 
We rank RATIO_OPT, RATIO_PES, SMOG, RESWORDS, RATIO_NUM, and RATIO_ 
HOR into deciles, with RATIO_OPT and SMOG inverse ranked. We then aggregate the decile 
ranks into a composite measure of CSR disclosure score (DSCORE). CSR reports with fewer 
optimistic keywords, more pessimistic keywords, higher readability, more length net of 
complexity/obfuscation, more numerical content, and more horizon content have higher DSCORE. 
The decile ranking mitigates potential noise in measurement and enables a meaningful aggregation 
across the six aspects of disclosure.  
Appendix 1 describes the textual analysis and computation of DSCORE. In general, firms 
with High (Low) DSCORE have consistently high (low) decile ranks in many of the six aspects of 
DSCORE. Table 2 compares mean and median of the six aspects of DSCORE across the low, 
middle, and high DSCORE groups. As indicated by the positive correlations among the six aspects 
of DSCORE, each aspect increases, on average, moving from the low to the high DSCORE. 




Table 2 also compares mean and median KLD ratings and firm characteristics across the 
No-CSR-Report group and the DSCORE groups. Mean KLDSTRENGTH, which is the sum of 
KLD’s positive ratings for different CSR categories, are 0.86, 4.54, 5.99, and 6.12 for the no-CSR, 
low, mid, and high DSCORE groups, respectively.12 Mean KLDCONCERN, which is the sum of 
KLD’s negative ratings for different CSR categories, are 1.33, 2.96, 3.70, and 4.11 for the No-
CSR-Report, and low, mid, and high DSCORE groups, respectively. Moving from the low to the 
high DSCORE group, KLD Strength and Concern ratings increase by 35% and 39%, suggesting 
that better CSR report narratives are informative for favorable and unfavorable CSR information 
alike. DSCORE is also associated with various firm characteristics, indicating the importance of 
controlling for firm characteristics while testing the association between CSR report disclosures 
and analyst forecast accuracy.  
Table 3, Panel A shows that the percentage of CSR reports classified as low, middle, and 
high DSCORE are relatively constant over time at around 45%, 30%, and 25%. Table 3, Panel B 
shows that wholesale and finance industries stand out as having a lower proportion of CSR reports 
with high DSCORE’s.  
3.3 Research Design  
We test whether higher CSR report disclosure score is associated with analyst forecast 
accuracy by augmenting Dhaliwal et al.’s (2012) model as below: 
                                                          
12 KLD rates CSR performance of a large number of firms by using surveys, corporate reports, and news articles. KLD 
rates CSR performance on seven categories: corporate governance, community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, product, and an exclusionary screen for firms deriving revenues from “sin activities” such as alcohol, 
gambling, and tobacco. When summing up all the positive and negative indicators, we do not consider the corporate 
governance dimension of the KLD ratings because information transparency is part of that score, and including this 
dimension could induce a mechanical association between our disclosure score and analyst forecasts accuracy. In 
robustness tests, we include the corporate governance dimension and find similar results. 
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FERROR(X) = β0 + β1 LowDSCORE + β2 MidDSCORE + β3 HighDSCORE 
+ β4 KLDSTRENGTH + β5 KLDCONCERN + β6 ANALYST + β7 SIZE  
+ β8 ROAVOL+ β9 LOSS + β10 FHORIZON + β11 FFIN  
+ β12 ASSURANCE + β13LEV+ β14 ROA + β15 R&D + β16 CAPX + β17 AGE 
+ β18 MKTSHARE + β19 MILLS + γ INDUSTRY + δ YEAR + ε 
    
(1) 
FERROR(X) is the average absolute value of forecast errors scaled by the beginning of the year 
price and multiplied by 100. X has values of 0, 1, or 2, standing for current year, one-year ahead, 
and two-year ahead forecasts, respectively. The coefficient estimates for the low, mid, and high 
DSCORE groups capture the incremental effect of the respective CSR report disclosure score 
groups relative to companies with no CSR reports. We expect negative coefficient estimates that 
decrease with DSCORE. CSR performance ratings are often available to investors through third 
parties, such as KLD. In order to isolate the effect of DSCORE on analyst forecasts, we control 
for CSR performance ratings by including KLD Strength and Concern ratings in Eq. (1). 
Eq. (1) uses several control variables that are likely to confound the association between 
DSCORE and forecast accuracy (Hope 2003; Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Analyst following 
(ANALYST) proxies for stronger competition and higher incentives for analysts to enhance 
forecast accuracy (Lys and Soo 1995). We expect a negative coefficient estimate for ANALYST. 
Firm size (SIZE) proxies for a firm’s general information environment (Atiase 1985; Hope 2003). 
We expect a negative coefficient estimate for SIZE. Earnings volatility (ROAVOL) proxies for 
forecast difficulty (Dichev and Tang 2009). We expect a positive coefficient estimate for 
ROAVOL. Earnings of companies with accounting losses (LOSS) are difficult to predict (Hope 
2003). We expect a positive coefficient estimate for LOSS. The median number of days between 
analyst forecasts and earnings announcements (FHORIZON) proxies for the amount of 
information available to analysts (O’Brien 1990). We expect a positive coefficient estimate for 
FHORIZON. FFIN is an indicator of financial opaqueness, which is one if scaled accruals of a 
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firm are higher than the industry-year average (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Dhaliwal et al. 2012). We 
expect a positive coefficient estimate for FFIN. We also control for an indicator for whether the 
CSR report is audited by an independent party (ASSURANCE). To the extent that CSR reports 
with external assurance are perceived by analysts to be more credible (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Casey 
and Grenier 2015; Pflugrath et al. 2011), we expect a negative coefficient estimate for 
ASSURANCE.  
Eq. (1) also treats for self-selection, because CSR disclosures can only be observed in 
standalone CSR reports. Several factors—some unobservable—determine a firm’s decision to 
issue CSR reports. Eq. (1) includes the inverse Mills ratio computed from the self-selection 
treatment in order to control for these unobservable factors (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Eq. (1) also 
includes all independent variables in the self-selection regression LEV, ROA, R&D, CAPX, AGE, 
and MKTSHARE—but exclude instrumental variables BLUE STATE, RELIGIOUS, DJINDEX, 
and GREEN. Appendix 3 describes the self-selection treatment in detail.13 Finally, Eq. (1) includes 
industry and year fixed effects, because CSR reports are concentrated in some industries and 
exhibit an overall time trend.14 All variables in Eq. (1) are defined in Appendix 2. 
 
4. Main Results 
Table 4, Panel A compares descriptive statistics for forecast errors across DSCORE groups. 
For the No-CSR-Report, and low-DSCORE, mid-DSCORE, and high-DSCORE groups, the 
average FERROR(0) are 6.94%, 2.90%, 3.15% and 1.90%; the average FERROR(1) are 13.56%, 
                                                          
13 Companies in three of the Fama-French 48 industries do not publish any CSR reports. A total of 173 observations 
from those industries are dropped from the selection model because of perfect prediction, therefore the sample size 
used in multivariate analyses drops from 24,020 to 23,847. 
14 Although year-fixed effects control for time-invariant characteristics, the 2008 financial crisis may introduce bias. 
All our inferences remain the same when we repeat our analyses in the pre-crisis period. 
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6.23%, 6.6% and 5.36%; and the average FERROR(2) are 18.41%, 8.31%, 8.53% and 7.25% of 
the share price, respectively. Forecast errors generally decrease with DSCORE. Moving from the 
low to the high DSCORE group, FERROR(0) decreases by 35%, FERROR(1) decreases by 14%, 
and FERROR(2) decreases by 13%. This trend provides preliminary support to our empirical 
prediction.  
Table 4, Panel B reports results of estimating Eq. (1), after standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering by firm. Across columns, the coefficient estimates for MidDSCORE and HighDSCORE 
are negative and statistically significant. In other words, forecast errors decrease with DSCORE, 
consistent with Panel A. Moving from low to high DSCORE group reduces FERROR(0), 
FERROR(1) and FERROR(2) by 3.2%, 5.1%, and 6.4% of share price, respectively. These 
differences are statistically significant. The signs on the control variables are generally consistent 
with Dhaliwal et al. (2012). As expected, forecast errors increase with firm size, earnings volatility, 
loss status, and forecast horizon. At the same time, the coefficients for FFIN and ASSURANCE 
are not significant, and the coefficient for analyst following (ANALYST) is significantly positive. 
We attribute these differences with Dhaliwal et al. (2012) to the additional CSR-related variables 
in our model as well as differences in sample characteristics (for instance, Dhaliwal et al. use an 
international sample). We examine assurance and financial reporting narratives separately in the 
additional analysis section (see Sections 5.4 and 5.5). Inverse Mills ratio (MILLS) estimated from 
the first stage probit model is significant, supporting the importance of controlling for 
unobservable factors arising from the selection problem. Unreported regression diagnostics show 
no evidence of multicollinearity, as variance inflation factors are lower than five.   
Table 4, Panel C reports results of estimating Eq. (1) using the continuous measure of 
DSCORE, rather than the low, mid, and high DSCORE indicators. In this specification we include 
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an indicator for issuing a CSR report (CSRREPORT), because DSCORE is inherently an 
interaction between issuing a CSR report and the disclosure score of that report. In the first column, 
we test the benchmark FERROR(0) model from Dhaliwal et al. (2012) without the DSCORE 
variable. Consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2012), the coefficient on CSRREPORT is negative and 
significant. In the second column, we add our main test variable DSCORE, and the coefficient 
estimate for DSCORE is negative and significant, supporting our hypothesis. Interestingly, 
CSRREPORT is no more significant when we add DSCORE in Eq. (1). In columns 3 through 6, 
we repeat the analyses with FERROR(1) and FERROR(2), and find similar results.  
Overall, findings in Table 4 suggest that firms issuing CSR reports with low DSCORE do 
not necessarily improve analyst forecast accuracy relative to firms issuing no CSR reports.  
However, firms issuing CSR reports with mid and high DSCORE improve analyst forecast 
accuracy. The findings extends prior literature by showing that the CSR reporting quality plays an 
important role in affecting analyst forecasts in addition to the decision to issue CSR reports.  
 
5. Additional Analysis 
5.1 Components of CSR Report Disclosure Score  
CSR reports vary in the components of the DSCORE. In the absence of theory on which 
components drive the CSR report informativeness, we empirically search for the major drivers of 
CSR report informativeness. Consistent with the prior analysis, we divide the six DSCORE 
components into high (i.e., upper quartile) and low (i.e., lower three quartiles) groups in order to 
address non-linear effect of these components on analyst forecasts. Consistent with our reverse 
ranking of RATIO_OPT and SMOG components while constructing the DSCORE, we multiply 
these two components by -1 before identifying the high and low groups. 
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Table 5, Panel A compares descriptive statistics for forecast errors between the high and 
low component groups. For low and high RATIO_HOR groups, the average FERROR(0) is 2.73% 
and 2.89%; the average FERROR(1) is 6.56% and 5.24%; and the average FERROR(2) is 8.49% 
and 7.39% of the share price, respectively. In other words, analyst forecast errors generally 
decrease with RATIO_HOR. A similar pattern is observed in RATIO_PES, RATIO_OPT*(-1), 
and SMOG*(-1) components. RATIO_NUM and RESWORDS components, however, show the 
opposite pattern. For instance, for low and high RATIO_NUM groups, the average FERROR(0) 
is 2.24% and 4.02%; the average FERROR(1) is 4.88% and 9.26%; and the average FERROR(2) 
is 6.43% and 12.33% of the share price, respectively. The univariate statistics should be interpreted 
with caution, because other factors that are correlated with the disclosure score components could 
be driving the statistics.  
Table 5, Panel B reports results of estimating a modified version of Eq. (1) that replaces 
DSCORE with the low and high indicators of DSCORE’s components. For brevity, we only report 
results with FERROR(0) as the dependent variable. Largely consistent with the univariate 
comparisons in Panel A, we find the following results. First, the high group of RATIO_HOR, 
RATIO_PES, and SMOG*(-1) components are negatively associated with analyst forecast errors. 
Second, the low groups of RATIO_NUM, RESWORDS, and RATIO_OPT*(-1) components are 
negatively associated with analyst forecast errors, while the high group of these variables are not 
statistically significant. The difference across the high and low groups are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels for either of the six components. Overall, individual components 
of DSCORE appear to not affect analyst forecasts as much as their aggregation, DSCORE. The 
non-linear relationship between DSCORE and forecast errors also suggests that some components 
may be informative at levels higher than their highest quartile. We conclude that components of 
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CSR disclosure score contribute to improved analyst forecast accuracy, but not in a linear fashion; 
and furthermore, considering the aggregate score appears to be more important  
5.2 First and Subsequent CSR Reports  
In our study, we predict and show that analysts would react to higher quality narratives of 
CSR reporting. Accordingly, in this section, we examine whether the positive association between 
DSCORE and analyst forecast accuracy is different between the first and subsequent issuance of 
CSR reports. To investigate, we re-estimate Eq. (1) after replacing DSCORE indicators with first 
and subsequent DSCORE indicators (i.e., FirstLowDSCORE and SubsLowDSCORE; 
FirstMidDSCORE and SubsMidDSCORE; and FirstHighDSCORE and SubsHighDSCORE). 
There are 401 first CSR reports in the sample, out of which 58% are classified as 
FirstLowDSCORE and 17% are classified as FirstHighDSCORE. 
Table 6 provides results of the estimation. When compared to first CSR reports, forecasts 
errors are lower for subsequent CSR reports and especially those CSR reports in the mid and high 
DSCORE groups.  This evidence suggests committing to a long-term disclosure strategy helps 
firms in building the credibility of CSR reporting over years. 
5.3 Incremental Effect of DSCORE over GRI and KLD Transparency Measures  
 
KLD rates a firm’s CSR disclosure quality using a Reporting Strength/Concern indicator. 
This rating is not focused on the CSR report narratives but on the overall CSR-related disclosures. 
In addition, many U.S. companies have increasingly issued their CSR reports following the GRI 
guidelines. A study conducted by the Governance & Accountability Institute shows that investors 
demand S&P 500 companies report CSR information under the GRI framework.15 Thus, KLD 
                                                          
15 The report entitled “2012 Corporate ESG/Sustainability/Responsibility Reporting- Does It Matter? Analysis of S&P 




reporting rating and GRI status can both proxy for CSR reporting quality. Nevertheless, developing 
an objective measure of CSR report disclosure is important for the following reasons. First, both 
KLD and GRI ratings are binary variables, and thus hold limited information about the disclosure 
quality of the CSR reports. Second, how KLD rates firms for CSR disclosure is not fully known. 
Third, GRI guidelines focus on the form but not substance of CSR disclosures. In contrast, our 
measure depends on the substance of the disclosures. Furthermore, it is transparent and thus can 
be refined by future research on different narratives.  
In this section, we test whether DSCORE is significantly associated with analyst forecast 
accuracy after controlling for the KLD reporting ratings and GRI status. Table 7, Panel A presents 
how low, mid and high DSCORE indicators correlate with indicators for companies following the 
GRI guidelines as well as indicators for companies with KLD-assigned reporting Strength and 
Concern ratings. We find that percentage of CSR reports that comply with the GRI guidelines are 
16%, 45%, and 53% for the low, mid and high DSCORE groups, respectively. That is, CSR reports 
that follow the GRI guidelines are also more likely to be classified as higher disclosure score by 
our substance-based measure. Similarly, percentage of CSR reports that have KLD-assigned 
reporting Strength (Concern) ratings are 22% (30%), 45% (24%), and 54% (27%) for the low, mid, 
and high DSCORE groups, respectively. That is, our CSR disclosure ratings correlate with the 
KLD reporting Strength and Concern ratings. Collectively, these univariate statistics provide 
additional validity to DSCORE.  
Table 7, Panel B reports the results of Eq. (1) after adding the indicators for companies 
following the GRI guidelines as well as indicators for companies with KLD-assigned reporting 
Strength and Concern ratings. DSCORE is incrementally associated with analyst forecasts errors 
after controlling both GRI status and KLD-assigned reporting ratings. In fact, the coefficient 
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estimates for these additional controls do not load significantly. Collectively, the results in Table 
7 corroborate the effect of DSCORE on analyst forecast accuracy.  
5.4 Controlling for Financial Narratives  
 We control for a company’s financial narratives using deciles of 10-K report optimism 
(10KOPT), pessimism (10KPES), readability (10KREADABLE), and length (10KLONG) in 
addition to other control variables in Eq. (1).16 We do this because CSR report narratives may 
simply reflect the companies’ financial narratives and thus the findings above may be driven by 
informativeness of financial narratives. Inconsistent with this explanation, Table 8 shows that a 
significant and positive association between DSCORE and analyst forecast accuracy remains after 
controlling for the variables measuring a company’s financial narrative style.  
5.5 CSR Disclosure Score and CSR Assurance 
Assurance of CSR reporting by independent organizations, while uncommon, reduces 
information asymmetry between companies and investors (Casey and Grenier 2015). Accordingly, 
we examine whether external assurance of CSR reports substitutes or complements disclosure 
quality. Specifically, we add to Eq. (1) the interaction of DSCORE and ASSURANCE. Table 9 
reports results of this estimation. Although the main effect of ASSURANCE does not load up in 
our earlier regression models (see Table 4, Panel B), the interaction is significantly negative. In 
other words, the positive effect of DSCORE on forecast accuracy is enhanced when the CSR report 
is also audited, suggesting that CSR disclosure quality and CSR assurance are complements to one 
another in improving analyst forecast accuracy.  
 
                                                          
16 We use our Java based textual analysis algorithm to calculate 10-K optimism, pessimism, readability, and length 
scores. Since this requires extensive resources, we limit the sample period to years 2000 to 2009. We do not consider 
numerical and horizon content in the 10-K, because part of numerical and horizon content is mandated (e.g., tables). Appendix 
1 includes definition of variables. 
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6. Conclusion  
Unlike financial reporting, which is subject to a well-developed accountability framework, 
CSR reporting is largely voluntary and unregulated. Yet prior literature shows that issuance of 
standalone CSR reports is associated with capital market benefits such as lower cost of capital and 
analyst forecast accuracy (Dhaliwal et al. 2011, 2012). In this paper, we search for an explanation 
behind these findings. In particular, we ask whether capital market benefits come primarily 
because of the fact that companies disclose their CSR activities in a standalone CSR reports or 
because of the quality and credibility of their disclosures in their CSR reports.  
We rate the quality of disclosures in standalone CSR reports using insights from the 
financial reporting literature that use computer linguistic techniques. We assign higher disclosure 
scores if CSR reports have fewer optimistic and more pessimistic keywords; if they are more easily 
readable; if they are longer; and if they have more numeric and horizon content. Our tests show 
that analyst forecast accuracy increases with CSR report disclosure scores. In addition, firms with 
low CSR report disclosure scores do not have better analyst forecast accuracy than firms without 
CSR reports. These findings highlight the importance of high-quality CSR report disclosures in 
comparison to simply issuing CSR reports.  
Our paper uses objective criteria for analyzing CSR report narratives and takes a first step 
in developing a disclosure score for standalone CSR reports. Our analysis regarding the six 
individual components of the disclosure score shows that individual components are not 
statistically significantly associated with analyst forecast accuracy. While this suggests the 
importance of aggregating individual components of disclosure quality, future research can help 
to refine our disclosure score by either considering additional aspects of CSR report narratives 
and/or refining our linguistic measures, noting the importance of non-linearity as well as 
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aggregation of the components. We believe that our measure of CSR disclosure quality has 
significant potential to summarize the narratives in other financial and non-financial contexts, and 
thus help regulatory efforts to make these disclosures more effective. For instance, the SEC has 
been reviewing overall disclosure requirements and considering ways to improve the disclosure 
regime for the benefit of both companies and investors since December 2013 
(https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/disclosure-effectiveness.shtml).  
We use computer linguistic methods that can be readily employed on larger samples with 
lower risk of subjective evaluations; nevertheless, the limitation of our approach is that the measure 
could introduce noise. Following a different track, Sethi et al. (2015) conduct a content analysis 
of CSR reports and score disclosure dimensions based on the level of details provided in the CSR 
report – the CSR-S Monitor.17 We echo Sethi et al.’s (2015) suggestion that various methods will 
incrementally validate disclosure quality, given the significant variation in CSR reporting.  
                                                          
17 CSR-S Monitor is a Weissman Center of International Business Project at Baruch College, City University of New 
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Appendix 1: Textual Analysis  
 
Procedure 
1. We match CSR reports with firm identifiers in the Compustat and CRSP databases, i.e., 
CUSIP, PERMNO, TICKER, and GVKEY, resulting in 1,796 firm-years with CSR reports. 
2. We format CSR reports to txt format and use a Java code to analyze narratives in the reports.  
3. Some firms publish CSR reports every two or three years. We assume that firms have the 
same CSR report narratives in non-report years as in their most recent CSR reports. For 
example, if a firm issued CSR reports in 2008 and 2010 (but not in 2009 and 2011), we fill 
CSR data in 2009 with that in 2008, and CSR data in 2011 with that in 2010. This forward-
filling procedure increases our sample from 1,796 to 2,462 firm-years. 
 
Aspects of CSR Report Disclosure Score 
Based on prior literature, we consider a CSR report to have a high disclosure score if (1) it 
includes fewer optimistic words, (2) it includes more pessimistic words, (3) it is readable, (4) it is 
long, (5) it includes numerical information, and (6) it includes horizon-related information. CSR 
report disclosure score (DSCORE) is composed of the following six independent components:  
 
1. Optimism (RATIO_OPT): Number of financial positive words divided by total number of 
words in the CSR report (Loughran and McDonald 
2011; http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html). 
 
2. Pessimism (RATIO_PES): Number of financial negative words divided by the total number of 
words in the CSR report. (Loughran and McDonald 
2011; http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html). 
 
3. Readability (SMOG): The Smog (Simple Measure of Gobbledygook) index is based on the 
number of years of formal education a reader of average intelligence would need to read and 
understand the text. It is defined as 1.043*[(number of polysyllables)*(30/(number of sentences))]1/2 + 
3.1291. Polysyllables are words that have more than three syllables. 
 
4. Length (RESWORDS): We first measure the length of a CSR report by the logarithm of the 
total number of words (WORDS). We then orthogonalize WORDS relative to its obfuscation 
component (SMOG).  RESWORDS is defined as the residual from the regression WORDS= α + 
β*SMOG + ε, which is estimated for each year and Fama-French (1997) industry. 
 
5. Numerical content (RATIO_NUM): Number of Arabic numerals and numerical words 
divided by the total number of words in the CSR report (Muslu et al. 2015). Numerical words are 
the following words: “first”, “second”, “third”, “fourth”, “fifth”, “sixth”, “seventh”, “eighth”, 
“ninth”, “tenth”, “eleventh”, “twelfth”, “thirteenth”, “fourteenth”, “fifteenth”, “sixteenth”, 
“seventeenth”, “eighteenth”, “nineteenth”, “twentieth”, “half”, “quarter”, “double”, “triple”, and 
“quadruple”.  
  
6. Horizon content (RATIO_HOR):  The number of references to future years and horizon 
words divided by the total number of words in the CSR report (Muslu et al. 2015). 2012 (2007) 
is (is not) a future year reference for a CSR report issued in 2008. Horizon words include short-
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horizon and long-horizon words. Short-horizon words are the following words: “short term”, 
“short-term”, “current fiscal”, “current quarter”, “current year”, “months”, “coming month”, 
“coming period”, “coming quarter”, “following month”, “following period”, “following quarter”, 
“incoming month”, “incoming period”, “incoming quarter”, “next month”, “next period”, 
“subsequent month”, “subsequent period”, “subsequent quarter”, “upcoming month”, “upcoming 
period”, “upcoming quarter”.  Long-horizon words are the following words: “k years” where k is 
from 2 to 20 in numbers and from “two” to “twenty” in writing; “century”, “decade”, 
“foreseeable future”, “long-term”, “long term”, “coming year”, “following year”, “incoming 
year”, “next year”, “subsequent year”, and “upcoming year”. 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Six Aspects of DSCORE 
The table below provides the descriptive statistics of the six components of DSCORE: 
*1,000 except SMOG 
and RESWORDS Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max 
RATIO_OPT 15.9 6.0 0 13.0 15.8 19.0 36.0 
RATIO_PES 7.9 4.2 0 5.3 7.5 10.1 22.6 
SMOG 20.3 13.3 4.5 17.5 18.6 19.7 128.4 
RESWORDS 0.0 1.0 -3.6 -0.6 0.1 0.8 2.2 
RATIO_NUM 38.0 23.9 0 23.0 34.4 46.8 160.4 
RATIO_HOR 1.6 1.3 0 0.8 1.3 2.0 7.1 
Average RATIO_OPT is higher than RATIO_PES, consistent with managerial optimism in CSR 
disclosures. Average SMOG implies that an average reader needs to have a graduate level degree 
to understand a CSR report. Average RESWORDS is by definition zero. Average RATIO_NUM 
and RATIO_HOR suggest that firms frequently use numerical and horizon content in CSR 
reports.  
 
The table below reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations of the six components below (above) 
the diagonal. *, **, *** show statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  RATIO_ RATIO_ SMOG RES RATIO_ RATIO_ OPT PES WORDS NUM HOR 
RATIO_OPT  0.10*** 0.01 -0.10*** -0.07** 0.20*** 
RATIO_PES 0.90***  0.02 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
SMOG -0.10*** -0.10***  0.03 0.10*** 0.08*** 
RESWORDS -0.07*** 0.02 -0.00  0.10*** 0.10*** 
RATIO_NUM 0.40*** 0.40*** -0.03 -0.06**  0.40*** 
RATIO_HOR 0.40*** 0.40*** -0.05* -0.05* 0.80***   
RATIO_OPT and RATIO_PES are positively correlated. RATIO_OPT is negatively correlated with 
both RESWORDS and RATIO_NUM, whereas RATIO_PES is positively correlated with both 
components. This indicates that, in contrast to pessimistic tone, optimistic tone is less supported by 
other aspects of DSCORE. RESWORDS and SMOG have zero correlation by design. RATIO_NUM 
and RATIO_HOR are positively correlated, suggesting that companies strategize in making more 
credible disclosures. In general, we observe positive, albeit at times insignificant, correlations among 






DSCORE: The sum of decile ranks (scaled between 0.1 and 1) of RATIO_PES, RESWORDS, 
RATIO_NUM, RATIO_HOR, and inverse decile ranks (scaled between 0.1 and 1) of 
RATIO_OPT and SMOG. 
 
DSCORE ranges between 0.6 and 6. We define the following indicator variables using DSCORE: 
LowDSCORE: Indicator variable that is one if DSCORE is less than 3.3 (sample median). 
MidDSCORE: Indicator variable that is one if DSCORE is greater than or equal to 3.3 and less than 
or equal to 3.9 (75th percentile of the sample). 
HighDSCORE: Indicator variable that is one if DSCORE is greater than 3.9. 
 
LowRATIO_HOR: Indicator variable that is one if RATIO_HOR is less than or equal to the 75th 
percentile of the sample. 
HighRATIO_HOR: Indicator variable that is one if RATIO_HOR is greater than the 75th percentile 
of the sample. 
 
LowRATIO_NUM: Indicator variable that is one if RATIO_NUM is less than or equal to the 75th 
percentile of the sample. 
HighRATIO_NUM: Indicator variable that is one if RATIO_NUM is greater than the 75th 
percentile of the sample. 
 
LowRESWORDS: Indicator variable that is one if RESWORDS is less than or equal to the 75th 
percentile of the sample. 
HighRESWORDS: Indicator variable that is one if RESWORDS is greater than the 75th percentile 
of the sample. 
 
LowRATIO_PES: Indicator variable that is one if RATIO_PES is less than or equal to the 75th 
percentile of the sample. 
HighRATIO_PES: Indicator variable that is one if RATIO_PES is greater than the 75th percentile of 
the sample. 
 
LowRATIO_OPT: Indicator variable that is one if RATIO_OPT*(-1) is less than or equal to the 75th 
percentile of the sample. 
HighRATIO_OPT: Indicator variable that is one if RATIO_OPT*(-1) is greater than the 75th 
percentile of the sample. 
 
LowSMOG: Indicator variable that is one if SMOG*(-1) is less than or equal to the 75th percentile of 
the sample. 
HighSMOG: Indicator variable that is one if SMOG*(-1) is greater than the 75th percentile of the 
sample. 
 
Defining 10-K Disclosure Variables 
We control for narrative features of 10-K reports. This required us obtain 10-K reports for firm-





10KRATIO_OPT: Number of financial positive words divided by the number of words in the 
10-K report (Loughran and McDonald 2011). 
10KOPT: Decile rank of 10KRATIO_OPT, between 0.1 and 1. 
 
10KRATIO_PES: Number of financial negative words divided by the number of words in the 
10-K report (Loughran and McDonald 2011). 
10KPES: Decile rank of 10KRATIO_PESS, between 0.1 and 1. 
 
10KSMOG: Smog index of the 10-K report. 
10KREADABLE: Inverse decile rank of 10KSMOG, between 0.1 and 1. 
 
10KWORDS: Logarithm of total number of words in the 10-K report. 
10KRESWORDS: The residual from the regression 10KLOGWORDS = α +β*10KSMOG + ε, 
which is estimated for each year and Fama-French (1997) industry. 



















RATIO_ HOR DSCORE 
High DSCORE        
2010 United Technologies  0.8 1 1 1 1 1 5.8 
2005 Newmont Mining  0.9 1 0.8 1 0.8 0.8 5.3 
2005 IBM 0.9 0.7 1 1 0.9 0.7 5.2 
2008 UPS  0.7 0.6 0.9 1 0.9 1 5.1 
2003 Parker-Hannifin 0.9 1 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.9 5.0 
         
Mid DSCORE        
2001 IBM 0.5 0.7 0.7 1 0.8 0.2 3.9 
2002 Ford Motor  0.4 0.7 0.3 1 0.6 0.9 3.9 
2002 P&G  0.2 0.6 0.9 0.5 1 0.7 3.9 
2005 Starbucks  0.5 0.3 0.8 1 0.5 0.8 3.9 
2007 OfficeMax  0.8 0.4 1 0.7 0.8 0.2 3.9 
         
Low DSCORE        
2000 Halliburton 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.9 3.2 
2002 Home Depot  0.1 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 3.2 
2002 Intel  0.1 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.7 3.2 
2003 Kimberly Clark  0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.7 1 3.2 







Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
CSR Report variables 
CSRREPORT An indicator variable that is one if the firm issued a Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) report in a given year. 
SubsLow(Mid) 
[High] DSCORE  
An indicator variable that is one if the firm-year is in the Low(Mid)[High] CSR reporting 
disclosure score group for the second year in a row. 
FirstCSR An indicator variable that is one if the CSR report is the first CSR report of the firm. 
FirstLow(Mid) 
[High] DSCORE 
An indicator variable that is one if the first firm-year observation with a CSR report is in 
the Low(Mid)[High] DSCORE group. 
 




CSR Strength score issued by KLD for the main categories of community, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, product, and diversity.  
CSR Concern score issued by KLD for the main categories of community, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, product, and diversity.  
 
Analyst forecast variables  
FERROR(X) The average absolute value of all forecast errors, multiplied by 100 and scaled by the 
stock price at the beginning of the year. X=0,1,2 stand for contemporaneous, one-year 
ahead and two-years ahead forecasts, respectively. 
 
DISPERSION The standard deviation of analyst forecasts for current year earnings, divided by the year-
end stock price. 
 
Control variables  
AGE Natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm’s first appearance in CRSP. 
ANALYST Number of analysts following the firm in a given year.  
ASSURANCE An indicator variable that is one if the CSR report is audited by an external auditor. 
BLUE STATE An indicator variable that is one if the firm’s headquarter is located in a blue state. A state 
is defined as a blue state if the state is carried by the Democratic Party in at least three of 
four presidential elections in 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012.  
CAPX The level of capital expenditures scaled by total assets.  
DJINDEX 
 
An indicator variable that is one if the firm is included in the Dow-Jones Sustainability 
Index. The coverage period of this data is 2002-2008. For years 2000 and 2001, we 
assume the same firms in 2002 are included in the index. For years 2009 through 2011, 
we assume the same firms in 2008 are included in the index.  
FFIN 
 
Measure of financial transparency based on industry-year-adjusted scaled accruals. Scaled 
accruals are calculated as the absolute value of a firm’s accruals averaged over the past 
three years scaled by total assets of the last year. Scaled accruals are computed as follows: 
ΔCA - ΔCL - ΔCASH + ΔSTD - DEP + ΔTP, where ΔCA (ΔCL) is change in total current 
assets (liabilities); ΔCASH is change in cash; ΔSTD is change in the current portion of 
long-term debt; DEP is depreciation and amortization expense; and ΔTP is change in 
income taxes payable. FFIN takes the value of 1 if a firm has higher than industry-year 
mean of scaled accruals, and 0 otherwise (Bhattacharya et al. 2003). 
FHORIZON 
 
Forecast horizon, calculated as the median number of days between analyst forecasts and 
earnings announcement.  
GREEN 
 
Newsweek Magazine’s green ranking based on environmental impact, initiation of green 
policies, and reputation. This rating, which is between 1 and 100, is available for 500 
large firms. We assume the minimum score for firms that do not have Newsweek green 
rating.  
LEV Long term debt scaled by total assets. 
LOSS Indicator variable that is one if the firm reports negative earnings at year end. 
MILLS The inverse Mills ratio from the first stage probit model as described in Appendix 3. It is 
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 used to control for the selection bias, i.e., the decision to publish a standalone CSR report. 
MKTSHARE The firm’s fraction of sales in its Fama and French (1997) 48 industry. 
R&D Research and development expenditures scaled by total sales. 
RELIGIOUS Religion ranking of the state in which the firm’s headquarters is located, which ranges 
between 1 and 51. The ranking is based on the ratio of the number of religious adherents 
in the firm’s state to the total population in that state in 2000 (The Association of Religion 
Data Archive). 
ROA Net income scaled by lagged total assets. 
ROAVOL Earnings volatility, computed as the standard deviation of previous five years’ ROA. At 
least three non-missing annual observations are required to calculate earnings volatility. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of firm size, computed as common shares outstanding multiplied by 
fiscal year-end price.  
 
Alternative CSR Report Disclosure scores  
KLD_REPORT 
STRENGTH 
An indicator variable that is one if KLD evaluates a firm's reporting on social 
responsibility (CSR)/sustainability efforts to be high. Factors affecting this evaluation 
include, but are not limited to, the completeness and specificity of a firm's reporting, 
setting of specific goals for CSR efforts, and quantitative measurement of progress 
towards these goals. The strength indicator shows that the company is particularly 
effective in reporting on a wide range of social and environmental performance measures, 
or is exceptional in reporting on one particular measure. 
KLD_REPORT 
CONCERN 
An indicator variable that is one if KLD evaluates a firm's reporting on social 
responsibility (CSR)/sustainability efforts to be low. Factors affecting this evaluation 
include, but are not limited to, the completeness and specificity of a firm's reporting, 
setting of specific goals for CSR efforts, and quantitative measurement of progress 
towards these goals. The concern indicator shows that the company is distinctly weak in 
reporting on a wide range of social and environmental performance measures. 





Appendix 3: Self Selection 
DSCOREs can only be defined in companies with CSR reports. Several factors—some 
unobservable—determine a firm’s decision to provide CSR reports (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). If 
unaccounted for, these factors could lead to erroneous conclusions about the relationship between 
DSCORE and analyst forecast accuracy. We address this selection issue by using the Heckman 
(1979) procedure. Following Dhaliwal et al. (2012), we estimate the following first-stage probit 
model of a firm’s decision to issue a CSR report in a year:  
 
  P(CSRREPORT=1) 
 Coefficient z-stat 
BLUE STATE 0.06 0.67 
RELIGIOUS -0.00 -0.85 
DJINDEX 0.91*** 6.17 
GREEN 0.01*** 4.72 
ANALYST -0.00 -0.07 
SIZE 0.40*** 8.54 
ROAVOL -2.00*** -2.70 
FFIN 0.09 0.63 
LEV 0.13 0.58 
ROA -1.17*** -3.03 
R&D 0.28 0.37 
CAPX -0.82 -0.96 
AGE 0.31*** 6.04 
MKTSHARE 2.06 1.22 
   
Year and industry fixed effects Yes 
Pseudo R2 48.1% 
Observations 23,847 
 
The variables are defined in Appendix 2. Robust z-statistics clustered at the firm level are reported next to the 
coefficient estimates. *, **, *** indicate statistically significant coefficient estimates at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. Following Deng, Kang, and Low (2013), we use BLUE STATE and RELIGIOUS as instruments 
because they are likely to capture a firm’s attitude towards CSR activities, and still they are unlikely to be 
related to analysts’ forecast accuracy. Following Dhaliwal et al. (2012), we include DJINDEX and GREEN as 
additional instruments because they are likely to capture the firm’s CSR performance. Firms with better social 
performance are more likely to make disclosures to differentiate themselves from other companies and gain 
competitive advantage. These instruments represent unobservable factors that are likely to be correlated with 
the firms’ decision to provide CSR disclosures. The coefficient estimates are consistent with Dhaliwal et al. 
(2012), with the exception of ROA. We find a negative association between ROA and the likelihood of issuing 
CSR reports while Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find a positive association. We calculate the inverse Mills ratio 
(MILLS) from the first stage model and use MILLS as an additional control variable in the subsequent 
empirical tests to control for the factors that lead to firm’s decision to provide CSR reports. 
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Table 1: Sample   
 
Panel A: Sample Composition by Year 
  
KLD  KLD Firms with  % of KLD Firms 
with CSR Reports   Firms  CSR Reports  
2000 455 34 7% 
2001 811 69 9% 
2002 848 98 12% 
2003 2,216 121 5% 
2004 2,362 143 6% 
2005 2,377 159 7% 
2006 2,378 180 8% 
2007 2,435 229 9% 
2008 2,459 278 11% 
2009 2,466 333 14% 
2010 2,684 425 16% 
2011 2,529 393 16% 
Total 24,020 2,462 10% 
    
Panel B: Sample Composition by Industry  
  
KLD  KLD Firms with  % of KLD Firms 
with CSR Reports   Firms  CSR Reports  
Consumer Non-Durables 1157 157 14% 
Consumer Durables 531 40 8% 
Manufacturing 2,273 390 17% 
Energy 1071 147 14% 
Chemicals  681 214 31% 
Business Equipment 4,213 370 9% 
Communication 765 36 5% 
Utilities 887 280 32% 
Wholesale, Retail, Services 2,256 204 9% 
Healthcare and Drugs 2,414 138 6% 
Finance 5,022 267 5% 
Other 2,750 219 8% 
Total 24,020 2,462 10% 
 
The sample includes all U.S. firms with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activity ratings issued by 
the KLD. The sample period is between 2000 and 2011. Panel A reports the sample breakdown across 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  No CSR 
Report 
DSCORE 
[Median] Low  Mid  High  
DSCORE (ranked) components 
   
(Inverse) Optimism 0 0.46*** 0.54*** 0.67*** 
[0] [0.4***] [0.5***] [0.7***] 
Pessimism 0 0.40*** 0.62*** 0.75*** 
[0] [0.4***] [0.6***] [0.8***] 
Readability 0 0.49*** 0.55*** 0.65*** 
[0] [0.4***] [0.6***] [0.7***] 
Length 0 0.41*** 0.64*** 0.75*** 
[0] [0.4***] [0.7***] [0.8***] 
Numerical Content 0 0.40*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 
[0] [0.3***] [0.7***] [0.8***] 
Horizon Content 0 0.41*** 0.60*** 0.73*** 
[0] [0.3***] [0.6***] [0.8***] 
     
CSR performance ratings    
KLDSTRENGTH 0.86 4.54*** 5.99*** 6.12*** 
[0] [4***] [5***] [5***] 
KLDCONCERN 1.33 2.96*** 3.70*** 4.11*** 
[1] [2***] [3***] [4***] 
     
Firm characteristics     
ANALYST 11.1 20.33*** 20.09*** 19.62*** 
[9] [19***] [19***] [19***] 
SIZE 6.97 9.25*** 9.38*** 9.43*** 
[6.85] [9.16***] [9.41***] [9.37***] 
ROAVOL 0.08 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
[0.04] [0.02***] [0.02***] [0.02***] 
LOSS 0.23 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
[0] [0***] [0***] [0***] 
FHORIZON 100.86 86.56*** 85.93*** 87.62*** 
[98] [92***] [92***] [92***] 
FFIN 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
[0] [0] [0] [0] 
ASSURANCE 0 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 
[0] [0***] [0***] [0***] 
LEV 0.19 0.20** 0.21*** 0.22*** 




(Table 2 continued) 
ROA 0.02 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
[0.04] [0.05***] [0.06***] [0.05***] 
R&D 0.04 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
[0] [0*] [0.01***] [0***] 
CAPX 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05*** 
[0.02] [0.03***] [0.04***] [0.04***] 
AGE 2.5 3.41*** 3.49*** 3.67*** 
[2.56] [3.64***] [3.71***] [3.81***] 
MKTSHARE 0.01 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** [0] [0.01***] [0.02***] [0.02***] 
 
Table 2 compares mean and median of DSCORE (ranked) components, CSR performance ratings, and firm 
characteristics across the No-CSR-Report group and the three DSCORE groups. *, **, *** indicate 
statistically significant mean and median differences at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels between the No-CSR-
Report group and Low, Mid, or High DSCORE groups. 
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Table 3: Sample with Low, Middle, and High Disclosure Score 
  
Panel A: DSCORE by Year 
 N Low  Mid  High 
2000 34 41% 35% 24% 
2001 69 35% 41% 25% 
2002 98 53% 26% 21% 
2003 121 48% 26% 26% 
2004 143 51% 23% 26% 
2005 159 52% 22% 26% 
2006 180 44% 34% 22% 
2007 229 52% 32% 16% 
2008 278 49% 32% 19% 
2009 333 47% 29% 24% 
2010 425 45% 34% 21% 
2011 393 44% 35% 21% 
 
     
Panel B: DSCORE by Industry 
 N Low  Mid  High 
Consumer Non-Durables 157 45% 29% 27% 
Consumer Durables 40 40% 33% 28% 
Manufacturing 390 44% 36% 20% 
Energy 147 44% 31% 26% 
Chemicals 214 24% 48% 29% 
Business Equipment 370 56% 29% 15% 
Communication 36 42% 42% 17% 
Utilities 280 39% 30% 31% 
Wholesale, Retail, Services 204 61% 27% 11% 
Healthcare and Drugs 138 34% 33% 33% 
Finance 267 69% 23% 8% 
Other 219 45% 22% 33% 
 
Table 3 reports percentage of the sample with low, mid, and high CSR reporting disclosure score across years 
and industries. Appendix 1 describes the procedure of computing DSCORE. 
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Table 4: CSR Reporting Disclosure Score and Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean No  DSCORE 
[Median] CSR Report Low  Mid High  
FERROR(0) 6.94 2.90*** 3.15*** 1.90*** 
[0.65] [0.4***] [0.44***] [0.41***] 
FERROR(1) 13.56 6.23*** 6.6*** 5.36*** 
[1.51] [0.98***] [1.01***] [0.98***] 
FERROR(2) 18.41 8.31*** 8.53*** 7.25*** 
[2.11] [1.32***] [1.46***] [1.49***] 
 
Panel B: Regression Results  
  FERROR(0) FERROR(1) FERROR(2) 
LowDSCORE -1.60 -3.33 -4.88 
 (-1.08) (-1.25) (-1.44) 
MidDSCORE -3.32* -6.36** -9.05** 
 (-1.87) (-2.06) (-2.26) 
HighDSCORE -4.83*** -8.42*** -11.25*** 
 (-2.81) (-2.68) (-2.67) 
KLDSTRENGTH 1.76*** 3.35*** 4.70*** 
 (5.02) (4.87) (5.05) 
KLDCONCERN 0.38 0.68 0.99 
 (1.32) (1.30) (1.39) 
ANALYST 0.62*** 1.17*** 1.40*** 
 (6.59) (6.93) (6.02) 
SIZE -8.29*** -15.26*** -20.00*** 
 (-9.09) (-9.74) (-8.96) 
ROAVOL 7.24** 15.01*** 19.50** 
 (2.42) (2.73) (2.31) 
LOSS 14.82*** 29.76*** 37.52*** 
 (7.31) (7.71) (6.86) 
FHORIZON 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 
 (5.09) (4.85) (4.50) 
FFIN -0.36 -1.54 -3.07 
 (-0.18) (-0.53) (-0.78) 
ASSURANCE -0.87 -2.36 -2.540 
 (-0.41) (-0.53) (-0.43) 
LEV 9.79*** 15.72*** 18.96** 
 (3.16) (2.97) (2.40) 
ROA -10.63* -19.80* -35.29** 
 (-1.82) (-1.72) (-2.10) 
R&D -26.44*** -41.22** -58.28** 
 (-2.81) (-2.48) (-2.45) 
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(Table 4 continued) 
CAPX 11.26 20.89 21.07 
 (0.85) (0.94) (0.64) 
AGE 1.75*** 3.98*** 5.27*** 
 (4.06) (4.50) (3.65) 
MKTSHARE 119.99*** 210.88*** 260.65*** 
 (5.42) (5.01) (4.44) 
MILLS 2.41** 4.39* 6.09** 
 (2.08) (1.95) (1.96) 
    
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2   9.7% 11.7% 12.0% 
N 23,847 22,898 18,675 
    
MidDSCORE - LowDSCORE -1.72 -3.03 -4.15 
(t-statistic) (-1.28) (-1.34) (-1.37) 
HighDSCORE - MidDSCORE -1.50 -2.06 -2.20 
(t-statistic) (-1.22) (-1.1) (-0.92) 
HighDSCORE - LowDSCORE -3.22** -5.09** -6.36** 




Panel C: Regression Results with Continuous DSCORE Measure 
  FERROR(0) FERROR(1) FERROR(2) 
CSRREPORT -2.80* 1.65 -5.31** 2.53 -7.45** 2.46 
 (-1.93) (0.61) (-2.03) (0.51) (-2.19) (0.42) 
DSCORE  -1.37*  -2.42*  -3.06* 
  (-1.81)  (-1.76)  (-1.85) 
       
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2   9.7% 9.7% 11.7% 11.7% 12.0% 12.0% 
N 23,847 23,847 22,898 22,898 18,675 18,675 
 
In Panel A, *, **, *** indicate statistically significant mean and median differences at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels between the No-CSR Report group and Low, Mid, or High DSCORE groups. In Panels B and C, *, 
**, *** indicate statistically significant coefficient estimates at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based on standard 




Table 5: Components of CSR Reporting Disclosure Score 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  No CSR 
Report 
RATIO_HOR RATIO_NUM RESWORDS 
[Median] Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  
FERROR(0) 
6.94 2.73*** 2.89*** 2.24*** 4.02** 2.38*** 3.64*** 
[0.65] [0.42***] [0.39***] [0.38***] [0.49***] [0.42***] [0.38***] 
FERROR(1) 
13.56 6.56*** 5.24*** 4.88*** 9.26 5.15*** 8.46** 
[1.51] [0.99***] [0.96***] [0.9***] [1.25***] [1.01***] [0.91***] 
FERROR(2) 
18.41 8.49*** 7.39*** 6.43*** 12.33 6.63*** 11.57** 
[2.11] [1.37***] [1.39***] [1.28***] [1.76***] [1.36***] [1.44***] 
        
 Mean  No CSR 
Report 
RATIO_PES RATIO_OPT*(-1) SMOG*(-1) 
[Median] Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  
FERROR(0) 
6.94 2.97*** 2.29*** 2.94*** 2.32*** 3.37*** 1.24*** 
[0.65] [0.4***] [0.44***] [0.4***] [0.42***] [0.45***] [0.33***] 
FERROR(1) 
13.56 6.72*** 4.90*** 6.53*** 5.24*** 7.51*** 2.80*** 
[1.51] [0.98***] [1.01***] [0.95***] [1.05***] [1.05***] [0.82***] 
FERROR(2) 
18.41 8.89*** 6.51*** 8.66*** 6.88*** 9.92*** 3.80*** 














Panel B: Regression Results  











RATIO_OPT * (-1) 
X= 
SMOG * (-1) 
              
Low[X] -2.36 -2.36* -3.01** -2.46 -2.86* -2.36 
 (-1.54) (-1.76) (-2.13) (-1.60) (-1.96) (-1.48) 
High[X] -3.62** -3.60 -1.99 -3.27* -2.29 -3.82*** 
 (-2.15) (-1.56) (-1.04) (-1.80) (-1.34) (-2.65) 
       
Firm 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and 
industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 9.7% 9.7% 9.7% 9.7% 9.7% 9.7% 
N 23,847 23,847 23,847 23,847 23,847 23,847 
       
High X-Low X -1.26 -1.24 1.02 -0.81 0.56 -1.46 
(t-statistic) (-0.88) (-0.66) (0.72) (-0.49) (0.48) (-1.21) 
 
In Panel A, *, **, *** indicate statistically significant mean and median differences at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels between the No-CSR-Report group 
and Low and High DSCORE groups. In Panel B, *, **, *** indicate statistically significant coefficient estimates at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based 
on standard errors clustered by firm. Appendix 2 provides variable definitions. 
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Table 6: First and Subsequent CSR Reports  
 
  FERROR(0) FERROR(1) FERROR(2) 
SubsLowDSCORE -0.56 -0.57 -1.01 -1.02 -1.68 -1.70 
 (-0.47) (-0.48) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.59) (-0.60) 
SubsMidDSCORE -5.04*** -5.04*** -9.64*** -9.65*** -12.76*** -12.76*** 
 (-3.32) (-3.32) (-3.26) (-3.26) (-3.15) (-3.15) 
SubsHighDSCORE -3.83** -3.82** -8.41*** -8.40*** -11.83*** -11.81*** 
 (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.69) (-2.69) (-2.83) (-2.83) 
FirstCSR  -0.40  -1.71  -2.09 
  (-0.29)  (-0.87)  (-0.72) 
FirstLowDSCORE -0.39  -1.85  -1.92  
 (-0.29)  (-0.79)  (-0.58)  
FirstMidDSCORE 1.46  1.53  1.33  
 (0.29)  (0.21)  (0.13)  
FirstHighDSCORE -3.05*  -5.73*  -7.16*  
 (-1.74)  (-1.90)  (-1.85)  
       
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2   9.7% 9.7% 11.6% 11.7% 12.0% 12.0% 
N 23,847 23,847 22,898 22,898 18,675 18,675 
       
SubsMidDSCORE-
SubsLowDSCORE -4.48** -4.47** -8.64** -8.64** -11.08** -11.07** 
(t-statistic) (-2.54) (-2.54) (-2.4) (-2.41) (-2.35) (-2.36) 
SubsHighDSCORE-
SubsMidDISCLOSURE  1.21 1.22 1.23 1.25 0.93 0.96 
(t-statistic) (0.74) (0.75) (0.42) (0.43) (0.24) (0.25) 
SubsHighDSCORE-
SubsLowDSCORE -3.27* -3.25* -7.41* -7.38* -10.15** -10.12** 
(t-statistic) (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.94) (-1.94) (-2.14) (-2.14) 
FirstMidDSCORE-
FirstLowDSCORE 1.84 
 3.38  3.24  
(t-statistic) (0.33)  (0.41)  (0.29)  
FirstHighDSCORE-
FirstMidDSCORE -4.51 
 -7.26  -8.49  
(t-statistic) (-0.82)  (-0.88)  (-0.77)  
FirstHighDSCORE-
FirstLowDSCORE -2.67 
 -3.88  -5.24  
(t-statistic) (-1.43)   (-1.24)   (-1.27)   
 
*, **, *** indicate statistically significant coefficient estimates at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based on 
standard errors clustered by firm. Appendix 2 provides variable definitions. 
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Table 7: Alternative Measures of DSCORE 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 No CSR  DSCORE 
Mean [Median] Report Low Mid High 
GRI  0 0.16*** 0.45*** 0.53*** 
 [0] [0***] [0***] [1***] 
KLD_REPORTSTRENGTH 0.01 0.22*** 0.45*** 0.54*** 
 [0] [0***] [0***] [1***] 
KLD_REPORTCONCERN 0.48 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 
 [0] [0***] [0***] [0***] 
 
Panel B: Regression Results  
 FERROR(0) FERROR(1) FERROR(2) 
LowDSCORE -1.87 -1.94 -3.89 -4.01 -3.89 -4.01 
 (-1.24) (-1.33) (-1.44) (-1.54) (-1.44) (-1.54) 
MidDSCORE -3.95** -4.06** -7.69*** -7.93*** -7.69*** -7.93*** 
 (-2.32) (-2.48) (-2.60) (-2.82) (-2.60) (-2.82) 
HighDSCORE -5.55*** -5.63*** -9.95*** -10.25*** -9.95*** -10.25*** 
 (-3.02) (-3.16) (-3.12) (-3.31) (-3.12) (-3.31) 
GRI  1.44 1.38 3.06 2.69 3.06 2.69 
 (0.92) (0.90) (1.01) (0.96) (1.01) (0.96) 
KLD_REPORTSTRENGTH  0.00  1.33  1.33 
  (0.00)  (0.36)  (0.36) 
KLD_REPORTCONCERN  -0.93  -0.31  -0.32 
  (-0.55)  (-0.08)  (-0.08) 
       
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2   9.7% 9.7% 11.7% 11.6% 11.7% 11.6% 
N 23,847 23,847 22,898 22,898 22,898 22,898 
       
MidDSCORE-LowDSCORE -2.08* -2.12* -3.80* -3.92* -3.80* -3.92* 
(t-statistic) (-1.67) (-1.67) (-1.8) (-1.84) (-1.8) (-1.84) 
HighDSCORE-MidDSCORE -1.60 -1.57 -2.27 -2.32 -2.27 -2.32 
(t-statistic) (-1.25) (-1.19) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.18) (-1.15) 
HighDSCORE-LowDSCORE -3.68*** -3.69** -6.06** -6.24** -6.06** -6.24** 
(t-statistic) (-2.65) (-2.5) (-2.48) (-2.41) (-2.48) (-2.41) 
 
In Panel A, *, **, *** indicate significant mean and median differences at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels between 
the No-CSR-Report group and Low, Mid, and High DSCORE groups. In Panel B, *, **, *** indicate 
significant coefficient estimates at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based on standard errors clustered by firm. 
Appendix 2 provides variable definitions. 
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Table 8: Controlling for Characteristics of 10-K Narratives 
 
  FERROR(0) FERROR(1) FERROR(2) 
LowDSCORE -0.80 -1.91 -3.06 
 (-0.45) (-0.59) (-0.76) 
MidDSCORE -3.16 -5.96 -9.13* 
 (-1.50) (-1.62) (-1.95) 
HighDSCORE -4.95** -8.49** -11.29** 
 (-2.51) (-2.33) (-2.28) 
10KOPT 2.03 3.47 6.04 
 (1.34) (1.26) (1.61) 
10KPES 6.13*** 10.19*** 13.93*** 
 (3.23) (2.99) (2.91) 
10KREADABLE 0.06 0.28 0.97 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.25) 
10KLONG 6.99*** 13.17*** 14.42*** 
 (4.00) (4.40) (3.50) 
    
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2   10.2% 12.3% 12.6% 
N 20,820 19,917 16,013 
    
MidDSCORE - LowDSCORE -2.36 -4.05 -6.07 
(t-statistic) (-1.41) (-1.44) (-1.6) 
HighDSCORE - MidDSCORE -1.79 -2.53 -2.16 
(t-statistic) (-1.19) (-1.15) (-0.74) 
HighDSCORE - LowDSCORE -4.14*** -6.58** -8.23** 
(t-statistic) (-2.66) (-2.32) (-2.39) 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistically significant coefficient estimates at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based on 
standard errors clustered by firm. Appendix 1 defines 10-K disclosure variables; Appendix 2 provides other 
variable definitions. Sample period is between 2000 and 2009. 
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Table 9: Incremental Effect of Assurance on Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
 
 FERROR(0) FERROR(1) FERROR(2) 
CSRREPORT 1.385 2.012 1.885 
 (0.51) (0.40) (0.32) 
DSCORE -1.291* -2.263 -2.895* 
 (-1.68) (-1.63) (-1.73) 
DSCORE*ASSURANCE -4.064** -9.538** -11.353* 
 (-2.04) (-2.09) (-1.88) 
    
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2   9.7% 11.7% 12.0% 
N 23,847 22,898 18,675 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistically significant coefficient estimates at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based on 
standard errors clustered by firm. Appendix 2 provides variable definition. 
